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Abstract :  In 2007 the Jordanian government announced its inten-
tion to build one nuclear power plant by 2015 and a number of others 
by 2030. The objective of this nuclear energy programme was to provide 
a sustainable domestic energy supply and relieve the burden of reliance 
on external energy sources. This burden has led to a massive strain on 
the government budget and produced domestic discontent, due to rising 
living costs which has negatively affected regime stability - this latter 
point is especially important in light of the current geopolitical changes 
sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This work 
explores the political economy of energy security in Jordan and the po-
tential role of nuclear energy in the coming decades and argues that 
there is an energy security dilemma in Jordan and this determines the 
nature of nuclear technology proliferation there. In this study a number 
of theoretical assumptions are posited concerning the impact of re-
source scarcity on economic and political stability which help shed light 
on Jordanian interests and policies. The nature of energy security and 
resource scarcity in other states in the MENA are often very similar. As 
such this case study offers some insights into the political economy of 
other nuclear energy programmes which have been announced in the 
past few years in that region, such as in Yemen and Egypt.1
Keywords :  Jordanian energy security, civilian nuclear power, nu-
clear proliferation, hydrocarbon dependence  
Introduction 
Since the 1960s the issue of nuclear technology proliferation in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been high on the political 
agendas of both regional actors and those further afield. A number 
of MENA states have pursued nuclear technology programmes, 
some with a measure of success, such as Israel and Iran, while oth-
ers have, more recently, declared their intention to develop such 
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a programme (in some cases, as in Egypt, this is a resurrection of 
previously shelved plans which date back several decades). On 04 
July 2006 (the then un-challenged) Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, announced his government’s intention to develop a nuclear 
energy programme in order to produce nuclear energy for civilian 
use. The announcement came as Saleh registered his candidacy for 
a next presidential term for elections held later that year. O4cial 
international reaction to this declaration was rather slow and large-
ly muted. However, the announcement of the plan did not go com-
pletely unnoticed, even though it was declared that only civilian 
and not military nuclear technology was to be sought.2 In the years 
since Saleh’s announcement a number of states in the MENA re-
gion have declared their intentions to develop nuclear energy pro-
grammes of their own, with work well underway in some cases. In 
December 2006 the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is-
sued a statement declaring their intention to pursue nuclear energy 
programmes (they also reiterated their call for a nuclear weapons-
free MENA).3 This was followed by the GCC’s 2007 request to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist in developing 
civilian nuclear capacities.4 In mid-2006 Turkey announced plans 
to construct a series of nuclear power stations by 20155 while, in Oc-
tober 2007, Egypt presented its plans to develop a number of nucle-
ar power plants to generate electricity.6 Iran’s nuclear programme 
has rapidly gathered pace since 2006 and has come under increas-
ing scrutiny internationally, resulting in heightened tensions with 
both global powers, like the US and Britain, as well as with MENA 
states including Israel and Iran’s Muslim neighbours.7 The Jorda-
nian government has been caught up in the emerging regional pro-
liferation of nuclear technology and has been amongst the keenest 
to establish a nuclear programme. On 01 April 2007 (then) Energy 
Minister Khaled Sharida announced that Jordan intended to build 
one nuclear power plant to produce electricity by 2015.8 
The wave of plans for national nuclear energy programmes that 
has swept the region has raised many questions by observers con-
cerned with economic development, environmental sustainability, 
military security, and energy security.9 Indeed, the sensitive balance 
of political, social and economic relations within MENA ensures 
that the proliferation of nuclear technology will remain a politi-
cally and economically sensitive issue for the foreseeable future. 
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Significantly, a major dilemma in intra-MENA relations is the per-
ception-disparity problem faced by most, if not all, regional actors 
with regards to the nuclear programmes of their neighbours. The 
majority of governments in the region have varying perceptions of 
the need for nuclear energy, the purpose of specific nuclear pro-
grammes and the opportunities and challenges such programmes 
entail. In particular, whether the intention of developing a national 
nuclear energy programme becomes a major regional political is-
sue or not depends largely on the perceived objectives of such a pro-
gramme and the perceived rationale behind it, by both regional and 
global actors. While all states in the MENA region that have devel-
oped plans for nuclear programmes (except Israel) are signatories of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) concern over the pur-
suit of nuclear technology remains a sensitive area of discussion. 
A common theme that has emerged in the issue of nuclear prolif-
eration in the MENA region is the challenge of meeting domestic 
energy demands and the need for energy security. This has often 
been a stated rationale in the emerging nuclear energy programmes 
in the region, with the Jordanian government often highlighting 
energy security as the main challenge it faces in the post-2003 en-
vironment.10 
This work explores the problem of energy security in Jordan, 
what the political economy of nuclear energy there is and how this 
programme can help to meet the country’s energy demands. The 
key questions addressed here relate to what the Jordanian govern-
ment’s rationale for pursuing a nuclear energy programme appears 
to be and whether such a programme is likely to positively affect 
Jordanian energy security. This work argues that Jordan faces a se-
vere energy security problem, that this is the most significant secu-
rity threat currently faced by Jordan, and that the pursued nuclear 
energy programme is intended to attend to this challenge. The first 
section of this work reviews relevant energy security literature. The 
following section discusses energy security in Jordan and the politi-
cal and economic challenges this entails. An analysis of Jordanian 
policy and the nuclear programme comes in the third section and 
conclusions are drawn at the end. 
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Energy  Security  and  Government  Policy 
In 1979 Deese argued that energy security was ‘a widely discussed 
but little understood problem.’11 In some ways that is still the case 
today, although much research has been conducted on the is-
sue and significant strides have been made towards theoretically 
understanding energy security. Deese defines energy security as 
‘a condition in which a nation perceives a high probability that it 
will have adequate energy supplies at affordable prices.’12 One might 
add to this that this perception has to be held for the medium- to 
long-term future. The issue of perception is very important but is 
largely based on the rational assessment of the realities of energy 
production/sourcing and consumption in the domestic market. 
Deese’s model claims that there are two key levels of analytical 
relevance to energy security: the domestic and international levels 
of analysis.13 Any analysis of energy security in Jordan must consider 
the economic, political and social conditions within Jordan as well 
as conditions and processes of a more regional or global scope. Fur-
thermore, we need to consider the relationship between these two 
levels of analysis as deeply interconnected. Indeed, as Ohmae has 
argued, we are increasingly living in a world where national borders 
no longer serve to insulate domestic from international affairs.14 
Deese highlights that where problems with domestic energy supply 
exist, as in the case of Jordan where there are no reserves of hydro-
carbons of any significant amount (or any other form of fossil fuel), 
pressure for energy imports increases and it is this that has the 
most significant impact on energy security.15 Bosworth and Gheo-
rghe demonstrate that interdependencies in large energy systems, 
such as an energy importing state’s national system, are abundant 
and add to the complexity of the energy security problem.16 These 
interdependent relationships exist between actors involved in the 
production, transport and consumption of energy. At each stage 
there exists a myriad of actors and relationships which can often 
be in competition with each other. Even when cooperation is evi-
dent the interdependency found in such an energy system leads to 
challenges in ensuring coordination between the different actors. 
Furthermore, Bosworth and Gheorghe argue that ‘interdependen-
cies also cross international borders’17 thus linking the domestic 
and international levels of analysis. International hydrocarbons 
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pipelines as well as shipping infrastructure ties Jordan’s domestic 
energy transport system to those in Iraq, the GCC states, and Egypt. 
Resource scarcity can negatively influence international relations 
due to heightened competition for resources at the international 
level.18 Thus, the energy insecurity felt by some states can lead to 
policies aimed at securing the required resources which bring the 
state into conflict with others. Energy security can, therefore, be of 
importance at both the domestic and international levels of analy-
sis. The importance of energy security can partly be identified in 
the ways in which it impacts other issues of concern to national 
governments and private sector actors. It impacts on economic 
well-being (growth, stability, income), which in turn impacts on 
domestic political stability (re: regime survival in Jordan) and also 
directly impacts on military security (through the military industry, 
military fuels, and strategic constraints and objectives – defence of 
supply routes, stability of producing states etc.).19
In order to pay for their energy needs, developing states that rely 
on imports for the majority of their energy supply also have to rely 
on exports of their own goods and services in order to raise adequate 
revenue and foreign exchange. This increases their vulnerability to 
external events and processes (and actors). During a period of glo-
bal recession, for example, levels of international trade decline and 
the revenue earned from exports will subsequently decline also. 
Since mid-2008 this has been the experience of Jordan. In particu-
lar the decline in exports to the US – due partly to lower levels of 
imports to the US market since the financial crisis, and partly due 
to increased competition in the goods Jordan exports to that mar-
ket (mostly textiles and clothing) – is noteworthy. Events limited to 
single trading partner states and not at a global level also add to the 
vulnerability of small developing states. Due to the limited agency 
of small developing states at the international level there is little 
scope for the employment of foreign policies to deal with these vul-
nerabilities.20 As a result, policy focus turns inward towards domes-
tic policies aimed at managing energy demand. Governments that 
pursue liberal economic policies encourage a  system which does 
not easily allow for significant subsidies for domestic consumers. 
Limitations on government budgets also hinder the opportunity 
for subsidising domestic energy consumption. Since the late 1980s 
the Jordanian government has adopted economic liberalisation and 
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since King Abdullah II came to power (1999) these policies have 
been pursued with more vigour. Record budget deficits each year 
for the past decade have also left the Jordanian government little 
room to provide subsidies to the domestic market. An alternative 
major policy direction is, therefore, to encourage greater e4ciency 
in energy consumption and lower demands in ine4cient and non-
essential sectors.
The impact of bilateral and/or multilateral relations between 
energy importers and exporters can determine the nature of en-
ergy security within the importing states. A bilateral relationship 
between an oil importer and an oil exporter, for example, that is 
characterised by animosity, mistrust or outright conflict (such as 
economic sanctions or military engagement) is  likely to lead to 
a reduction in, or cessation of, trade in oil between them. The case 
of the European Union’s (EU) embargo on Syrian oil exports due 
to the Syrian government’s violent suppression of a pro-democracy 
movement (at the time of writing) is a case in point.21 At the same 
time however, positive relations between energy importing and 
exporting states does not necessarily equate to enhanced energy 
security for the former.22 There is certainly a correlation between 
the nature of international relations and domestic energy security; 
but energy security cannot be guaranteed simply by having good 
relations with exporters. The relationship between Jordan and 
Iraq since the mid-1990s, for example, was characterised by close 
cooperation in economic (and political) affairs and an agreement 
between the two governments ensured Iraq supplied Jordan with 
oil at a heavily subsidised price (at a  fraction of the international 
market price).23 That was up until the 2003 war in Iraq which ended 
trade in oil between the two states. Bilateral trade in oil has not 
recovered as of the time of this writing. Changes in international 
relations and/or domestic affairs are generally beyond the control 
of small states, such as Jordan, which may play a role in regional 
affairs, but this is often limited by the state’s level of agency at the 
international level and the behaviour of more powerful external ac-
tors.24 As such, the energy security of small states relies, to a large 
extent, on unilateral domestic and foreign policies. 
It is generally accepted that the most effective ways to ensure en-
ergy security include managing domestic demand (such as increas-
ing e4ciency in consumptive practices), improving the reliability 
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of external sources (diversification of sources, supporting stability 
in producing states and so on), and/or increasing domestic energy 
supplies.25 
Energy importing states can develop domestic supplies in order 
to lower their reliance on external sources, which is the primary 
challenge for energy security. However, the success of this policy 
direction in advancing energy security relies entirely on the avail-
ability of domestic resources. In terms of hydrocarbons this is lim-
ited to states that have significant recoverable reserves that can be 
exploited cheaply enough for it to be economically and strategically 
beneficial. Renewable energy resources are more widely available, 
in particular wind and solar energy. However, the development of 
these requires significant investment and this is often unavailable 
in developing states. Private sector investment is usually required, 
bringing in domestic and international non-state actors, which 
adds to the complexity of ensuring energy security. The technol-
ogy required for renewable energy is constantly developing and also 
requires the long-term involvement of the private sector. Nuclear 
energy technologies are much the same in that non-state actors as 
well as governments must be involved in the building and main-
taining of crucial infrastructure. The technologies required for nu-
clear energy often have to be procured by developing governments 
from developed states, leading to the internationalisation of do-
mestic nuclear energy programmes. Nevertheless, in the medium- 
to long-term, renewable and nuclear energy programmes require 
significantly less involvement from international actors and exter-
nal relations related to importing energy are significantly reduced 
and the key factor in energy insecurity is largely removed. The Jor-
danian government has a small number of sources of energy in the 
MENA region (currently led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt) but these 
external sources account for virtually all of Jordanian energy. In re-
cent years, however, private sector involvement in the energy sector 
within Jordan has been growing with involvement in the renewable 
energy sector and now the nuclear energy sector. 
Energy  Insecurity  in  Jordan 
Jordan is an extremely resource poor state with limited renew-
able freshwater supplies, no reserves of crude oil and very limited 
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natural gas supplies. While there are some supplies of shale oil in 
Jordan, estimated at over 65 billion tonnes,26 these are currently not 
readily recoverable in large quantities at viable prices.27 The total 
consumption of hydrocarbons in Jordan is approximately 108,000 
barrels per day for the former and 2.97 billion cubic metres per year 
for the latter. All of Jordan’s oil needs are imported while 2.72 billion 
cubic metres of gas are imported each year at a total cost of over $3.5 
billion (USD).28 Indeed, the problem of resource scarcity in Jordan 
has resulted in a near total reliance on energy imports. For much of 
Jordan’s modern history hydrocarbons have represented its main 
form of energy supply with alternative, domestic renewable energy 
sources only being used in any meaningful manner in more recent 
years. Jordan finds itself in a rather peculiar situation in the MENA 
region, neighbouring states with the world’s largest oil reserves and 
production levels as well as some of the world’s largest gas supplies, 
but being almost completely devoid of these resources itself. The 
fact that Jordan’s neighbours have large supplies of hydrocarbons 
has historically helped Jordan import these resources at lower than-
international market prices and to alternate, relatively quickly, be-
tween suppliers. The problem however, has been the unstable na-
ture of these supplies over the past decade or so coupled with the 
fact that Jordan has had to switch suppliers due to disruptions in 
production and transportation in other states – events and proc-
esses which cannot be influenced by the Jordanian government. 
Added to these problems has been the continued reliance on one 
or two main sources of energy imports for much of Jordan’s history 
since independence. An undiversified supply structure has left Jor-
dan in a vulnerable position and sensitive to changes in one state or 
another, such as Iraq in the 1990s and post-2003, or Egypt since the 
January-February (2011) revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak. 
A policy which is increasingly acknowledged as key to promoting 
energy security is the diversification of energy supplies to reduce 
any reliance on one or two sources and to have access to other sup-
pliers should there be a disruption in any supplying state(s).29 The 
Jordanian government has not yet managed to fully consider this 
challenge.  
For much of the past three decades Jordan has relied heavily on 
imports of oil from Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein the Iraqi gov-
ernment had maintained close economic ties with its Jordanian 
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counterpart and had supplied virtually all of Jordan’s oil imports. 
Furthermore, these supplies were fixed at a constant and low price 
for many years, with Jordan having to pay only a third of interna-
tional market prices.30 This was particularly the case through the 
1990s after the 1990-1991 Operations Desert Shield and Storm 
when Hussein’s regime was keen to reinforce its relationships to the 
few states that remained friendly to it. However, following the 2003 
US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, oil exports plummeted as 
the war itself led to the damage or destruction of much infrastruc-
ture and the years of insurgency that followed it led to further dam-
age and hindered reconstruction efforts. With the change of regime 
in Iraq the agreement regarding oil supply between Jordan and Iraq 
was cancelled and the latter’s oil industry liberalised. This resulted 
in Jordan having to seek oil supplies elsewhere. In 2003 Saudi Ara-
bia, Kuwait and the UAE agreed to offset the loss of oil supply from 
Iraq and maintain low prices for Jordan. However, these agree-
ments were only temporary and had expired by 2006,31 after which 
Jordan had to enter the international market for oil and compete 
for supplies on a level playing field with others. This meant unstable 
and much higher prices for oil than the Jordanian market was used 
to and was in a sense a form of shock therapy for that market. 
Since the early 2000s the Jordanian government has sought to 
somewhat diversify its energy imports by importing oil from more 
than one major supplier and by moving to natural gas consump-
tion. In the case of the latter, supplies of gas from Egypt through 
the Sinai Peninsula section of the Arab Gas Pipeline (which supplies 
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel with Egyptian natural gas) began 
in late 2003. But these attempts to adjust to greater consumption 
of natural gas and rely on Egypt for this source have been fragile. 
During the Mubarak regime, Jordan and Egypt (as well as Egypt and 
Israel) had signed an agreement for gas supplies that allowed Jordan 
to buy gas at around half the international market price. This pref-
erential agreement came under much scrutiny following the fall of 
the Mubarak regime in February 2011 and for several months the 
Jordanian and Egyptian (transitional) governments sought to rene-
gotiate the terms of the agreement. This dispute was finally settled 
in July 2011 when the two sides signed a new twelve year agreement 
that contains new terms on the price that Jordan will pay, which 
reflects an amount that is much closer to international market 
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prices.32 A series of attacks on the gas pipeline in the Sinai Penin-
sula through 2011, following the revolution in Egypt, led to signifi-
cant halts in gas supplies to Jordan, costing the economy $3 million 
(USD) each day that the supply was shut off.33 Combined, these two 
developments in Egypt have weakened Jordanian confidence in the 
ability of Egyptian natural gas supplies to contribute to Jordanian 
energy security. 
In addition to broader economic pressures, the Arab Spring has 
affected the political environment in Jordan and increased pressure 
on the Jordanian regime. While Jordan has not faced the level of 
instability as witnessed in Libya, Syria and Yemen, the pro-democ-
racy movement in Jordan is well established and popular sentiment 
implies that the government has to act on political and economic 
reform. People want better living conditions, higher salaries, more 
jobs, a better general economic situation as well as political trans-
parency and less corruption. This has been the case in Jordan for 
a number of years, especially in terms of economic issues, dating 
back to the structural adjustment programmes that followed the 
1989 financial crisis. Protests/demonstrations over rising food pric-
es and the reducing of government subsidies on food occurred in 
Ma’an and Amman in 199634 and protests against soaring fuel prices 
have been experienced across Jordan since 2008 as government 
subsidies have been removed in stages and international market 
prices have risen.35 The exceptionally high post-2003 market prices 
for hydrocarbons have presented the Jordanian government with 
the dual problem of a sky-rocketing energy import bill and domes-
tic discontent by the masses because of the subsequent increase in 
living costs, thus affecting regime stability.
While domestic fuel price volatility is impacting upon many fac-
ets of Jordan’s political economy, there is growing economic and 
political pressure on the government to find ways of increasing 
electricity supply while at the same time lowering and stabilising 
energy prices. According to the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission 
(JAEC) this has furthered the impetus driving the development of 
the Jordanian nuclear energy programme.36 As with any nuclear en-
ergy programme the Jordanian case has involved a  large number 
of domestic and international state and non-state actors. By early 
2011 the JAEC was seeking an international partner (private sector 
MNC) to help manage and maintain Jordan’s first nuclear energy 
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plant, which is expected to be a 1000 megawatt generation 3 reac-
tor and is planned to be fully operational by 2018.37 A further four 
nuclear power plants are intended to be completed by 2030 provid-
ing 30% of Jordan’s energy needs. Furthermore, the JAEC has been 
assisted by the Australia-based consultancy firm Worley Parsons in 
receiving and evaluating the bids from the private sector.38 Through 
2011 three bids were shortlisted: a  joint bid with AREVA (French) 
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japanese), Canadian AECL, and 
the Russian firm Atomstroyexport. However, selection of the suc-
cessful bid has been stalled somewhat by alterations to the selected 
site of the intended nuclear plant, which was initially to be con-
structed near Aqaba in the south of the country but is now planned 
for an area near Mafraq in the north39 (the reassessment of where 
to build the plant came after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant 
disaster in March 2011 in Japan). The site location and safety studies 
were carried out by the Belgian firm Tractebel Engineering, lasting 
for 2 years from September 2009 to late-2011.40 In 2010 the French 
firm AREVA signed an agreement with the Jordanian government 
to begin mining uranium ore from the central region of Jordan and 
to continue to explore for further reserves elsewhere in the coun-
try.41 As discussed below, exploration has led to the discovery of up 
to 120,000 tonnes of uranium ore within Jordan. 
In terms of inter-governmental cooperation, in early 2010 the 
US government helped fund the construction of Jordan’s first (and 
only) nuclear waste storage facility through the US Department of 
Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Fund.42 Furthermore, in March 
2010 the Jordanian and South Korean governments signed a  $70 
million (USD) soft loan agreement to support the purchase from 
the latter of a nuclear research reactor which is being built at The 
Jordan University of Science and Technology in northern Jordan 
and which is expected to be completed by 2015.43 The reactor is be-
ing built by Daewoo and the Korean Atomic Energy Institute. In 
addition to the involvement of international actors in the physi-
cal development of nuclear energy infrastructure capabilities the 
Jordanian Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC) – established in 
2007 and which has responsibility for creating the legal framework 
for any nuclear-related matters in Jordan – has created or revised 
26 laws determining the scope of the nuclear energy programme 
and the nature of international relations regarding this sector.44 
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According to the Director of the JNRC, Jamal Sharaf, the commis-
sion has expanded its staff from 250 in early 2011 to over 300 and 
expects to have 600 full-time employees by 2018 and the expected 
completion of the first nuclear power plant.45 
Over the past 4 years the Jordanian government has pursued 
a number of bilateral agreements with other governments aimed 
at forging frameworks for cooperation in the nuclear energy sec-
tor. These agreements have included text on the exchange or sale 
of technology, know-how/expertise, equipment and infrastructure. 
They have also contained text on the monitoring of the Jordanian 
nuclear programme and mechanisms to ensure its transparency. At 
the time of this writing, eleven such agreements have been signed 
with: Argentina, Canada, China, France, Japan, Romania, Russia, 
Spain, South Korea, Turkey and the UK, and negotiations are on-
going with the Czech Republic, Italy and the US.46 The Jordan-UK 
agreement, signed in 2009, directly refers to the need for both coun-
tries to meet their energy security needs and that this is recognised 
by both governments.47 It also refers to their rights and responsibili-
ties to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while managing 
and safeguarding nuclear material and technology as signatories to 
the NPT.48 Of particular importance in highlighting the spirit of the 
agreement is Article II, point 1a) which states: 
The Parties shall co-operate under this Agreement in the 
promotion and development of the peaceful non-explo-
sive uses of nuclear energy in the two countries, in [any 
of] the following area[s]: the implementation of projects 
for the generation of electricity and water desalination.49
The other bilateral agreements all contain similar text acknowl-
edging the core of the agreed upon frameworks for bilateral cooper-
ation in this field and the boundaries of the Jordanian programme. 
Negotiations with all prospective partners have not been as suc-
cessful, however, and in particular Jordanian-US negotiations have 
proven problematic.50 The Jordanian government approached the 
US administration before turning to other governments but an 
agreement has yet to be reached. While Jordan and the US have 
long had a constructive relationship and been close allies (with Jor-
dan receiving major non-NATO ally status from the US on 12 No-
vember 199651) the sensitivity of issues related to nuclear technology 
has proven to be insurmountable thus far. The key sticking point is 
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the Jordanian intention to enrich uranium ore within its own bor-
ders in order to provide itself with entirely domestically sourced 
fuel for its planned nuclear reactors. It should be noted that the key 
challenge of energy security for the Jordanian government has been 
the problem of importing its fuel needs, while access to domestic 
uranium ore presents the possibility to minimise fuel imports (dis-
cussed in more detail below). Thus the Jordanian government has 
sought to include a clause in its’ bilateral cooperation agreements 
that allows it to process its uranium resources to fuel level. The 
Jordan-UK agreement does not include text that allows Jordan to 
enrich uranium, however, it does not include text that disallows 
this either. Rather, the decision on this aspect of Jordan’s plans is 
deferred to a  later stage in the programme’s development. Article 
VI states that:
Each Party shall obtain the written consent of the other 
Party prior to the enrichment of any nuclear material sub-
ject to this Agreement to twenty (20) per cent or more in 
the isotope U235 or U233, or to the reprocessing of any 
nuclear material subject to this Agreement. Such consent 
shall describe the conditions under which the resultant 
uranium enriched to twenty (20) per cent or more, or the 
plutonium, may be stored, used or transferred. The Parties 
may establish an agreement to facilitate the implementa-
tion of this provision.52
The US government has argued that Jordan does not need to 
enrich uranium domestically but should instead sell its uranium 
ore resources on the global market and buy back enriched uranium 
from the cheapest supplier according to market mechanisms. It is 
important to note that a 2008 agreement of cooperation between 
the United States and the UAE for nuclear energy development in 
the latter included text which stipulates that the UAE will not seek 
to enrich uranium domestically but will purchase it on the global 
market.53 This is seen as weakening the case for the Jordanian gov-
ernment. 
Jordanian  Policy  and  the  Nuclear  Option 
The Jordanian government’s policies towards promoting national 
energy security are tied to broader domestic and foreign policies. 
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Energy security policies are seen to be interconnected with domes-
tic policies relating to economic growth and stability, the raising of 
living standards, reducing poverty, the provision of public services, 
political stability and to some extent environmental protection. 
Internationally, Jordan’s foreign policy has traditionally hinged on 
promoting peaceful relations with its neighbours and encourag-
ing stability in regional international relations54 (historically, with 
varying degrees of success) and securing energy supplies from the 
region features prominently here. Jordanian economic policy under 
King Abdullah II has been characterised by liberalisation, structural 
adjustment, privatisation and market-led practices. These policies 
have been driven by economic realities, such as the 1989 financial 
crisis when the Jordanian government defaulted on all of its external 
debt repayments.55 The government then signed an agreement for 
assistance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This agree-
ment stipulated that the Jordanian government must reduce (and 
remove in some cases) government subsidies on food, fuel and oth-
er basic commodities.56 The Jordanian government has also sought 
to facilitate external trade, in particular exports to large markets 
such as the US and EU, in order to promote economic growth at 
home and raise foreign exchange to pay for its imports.57 However, 
Jordan suffers from a trade deficit which reached over $7.7 billion 
(USD) in 2009.58 Energy imports accounted for approximately half 
of this figure at around $3.5 billion (USD) in 2010.59
Due to the nature of Jordanian economic liberalisation and the 
open-market economic system emerging there, re-introducing the 
sort of energy subsidies that existed before reform began in the 1990s 
is unlikely. It would also be extremely di4cult for the government 
to do this given record budget deficits (estimated at 5-6% of GDP in 
201060) and financial pressures stemming from Jordan’s experience 
of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession. The 
conclusion, it would seem, is that the only viable policy option that 
compliments the liberal economic policies being pursued in Jordan 
is to limit reliance on international energy sources and on the glo-
bal hydrocarbons sector more broadly speaking. Domestic, private 
sector driven, energy production makes a lot of sense given the type 
of economic policy decision-making in the Jordanian government 
and the energy security problems the country faces. 
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Within this context the Jordanian government has long ex-
pressed an interest in nuclear energy as a key domestic policy re-
lating to energy production and ultimately energy security within 
a broader framework of policy. In 1990 the Jordanian government 
sought the help of the World Bank in conducting an advisory study 
on energy management and planning in Jordan. The World Bank in 
turn requested that the IAEA conduct an energy and nuclear pow-
er planning (ENPP) study which the latter completed later in that 
year. The IAEA’s ENPP study concluded that due to the expected 
size of the electricity grid in Jordan, the availability of commercial 
reactors and their size, Jordan would not be able to pursue a nuclear 
energy programme for twenty to thirty years.61 This study demon-
strates that the Jordanian government’s policies regarding nuclear 
power extend back at least to the late 1980s and that the current 
pursuit of a nuclear energy programme is in line with the estimated 
timeframe suggested by the 1990 IAEA study. 
The discovery of up to 120,000 tonnes of uranium ore in Jor-
dan since has spurred the Jordanian desire for nuclear energy as 
this domestic source of nuclear fuel is seen by many in decision-
making circles in Amman as the key to ensuring Jordan’s energy se-
curity for decades to come.62 The availability of a domestic source 
of fuel, albeit not oil or gas, has the same effect on domestic energy 
production as the latter two have in hydrocarbons rich states. As 
discussed above, the most important element of national energy 
security is the sovereign access to, and control of, a domestic en-
ergy source which is not shared with other states and which is avail-
able if investment is made in the correct infrastructure.63 Rather 
than importing large quantities of hydrocarbons from other states 
at market prices (and occasionally at below market prices, as has 
been the case with gas from Egypt), the Jordanian market would 
have a reliable, domestic source of energy. Furthermore, in theory 
at least, other states would not necessarily be involved in produc-
ing and transporting this resource. It must be noted, however, that 
foreign non-state actors will be required to develop this source and 
engagement with other governments in multilateral and bilateral 
settings is required in some ways; engagement with the IAEA for 
example. As discussed above, any nuclear energy programme in 
Jordan will not make the country entirely self-su4cient in energy 
production for electricity and energy imports will continue to be 
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necessary, including hydrocarbons, for both domestic and trans-
port consumption. However, the availability of electricity produced 
domestically using a domestically sourced resource and domestic 
infrastructure can be seen as a way of minimising the impacts of 
external events or processes on domestic energy security as well as 
a means to diversify energy sources. 
The interconnections between Jordanian policy, both domestic 
and foreign, with its energy policies over the past few decades has 
resulted in some success in balancing Jordan’s international rela-
tions with regional and extra-regional powers. Furthermore, in 
many ways the Jordanian government has long acted as a stabilising 
actor in many of the region’s key relations, for example, the Pales-
tinian-Israeli conflict, with some success. However, the agency of 
Jordan as a small and relatively poor state, as well as one that is re-
source poor, is limited. The ability of the Jordanian government to 
help manage international relations in the Middle East in order to 
stabilise international energy relations is limited. For example, the 
Jordanian government could do very little besides publicly call for 
dialogue before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and it could only publicly 
decry the bloodshed that followed there in the following years. On 
the one hand, the Jordanian government and in particular its in-
telligence services have been deeply engaged in counter-terrorism/
insurgency operations in Iraq since 2003 and this has led to some 
results, including the 2006 assassination of Abu Musab Az-Zarqa-
wi, one of the prominent leaders of Al-Qaeda in Iraq after 2003.64 
On the other hand, this type of agency has done little to preserve 
stability in energy supplies generally speaking – and in some ways 
Jordan’s involvement in Iraq and elsewhere may even have nega-
tively impacted upon its energy security. Certainly, there have been 
tensions between the Jordanian government and the Al-Malaki led 
Iraqi government in the past few years and Jordanian-Iraqi relations 
have not been as close as they had been in the mid-to late 1990s and 
early 2000s. 
Consideration of agency aside, the Jordanian government has 
also had to reflect on its past experiences with economic policies 
aimed at managing domestic prices of goods and services and in-
creasing self-su4ciency. For much of its post-independence history 
Jordan’s government has pursued price subsidies for basic com-
modities and services, including food staples, fuel and electricity.65 
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The aim of these policies was to control domestic prices and ensure 
support for the Hashemite regime while limiting the impacts of ex-
ternal processes on the domestic market. However, given the small 
size of the Jordanian economy and its inherent vulnerabilities to 
external forces, public sector control of the economy and contin-
ued economic insulation were not possible indefinitely.66 Following 
the 1989 financial crisis in Jordan the government was faced with 
the dilemma of how best to ensure economic stability and growth; 
would this be through macro-economic restructuring as advocated 
by the IMF and adoption of the Washington Consensus, or through 
continued governmental control of the economy? Through the 
1990s the former direction was taken and Jordan’s economy has 
continued to liberalise since.67 At the same time this macro-eco-
nomic dilemma impacted upon the energy security dilemma in Jor-
dan. A key challenge that emerged through the 1990s was how the 
government could ensure energy security in Jordan at a time when 
concrete steps were being taken to liberalise the economy and fully 
integrate it into the global economic system.  
Broadly speaking there are three policy directions that may be 
undertaken in such circumstances. The first is to reduce domestic 
fuel demands. This is extremely di4cult for a developing country 
that is seeking to promote industrialisation and economic activity 
while facing a  rapidly growing population. Secondly, Jordan may 
seek external assistance from major regional or global powers that 
can ensure sustained energy supplies at stable prices. However, this 
policy increases reliance on external actors and institutionalises 
dependence on these actors. Finally, Jordan can increase domestic 
energy supplies and production. This policy requires significant in-
vestment of time, financial resources and technology, which also 
entails some measure of reliance on external actors for these. 
It is clear that the Jordanian government faces a major energy 
security challenge due to the country’s resource scarcity. Further-
more, it is not possible for it to remain insulated from external 
processes and events, and engagement with international actors is 
necessary regardless of how Jordan’s energy security problem can 
be met. However, there does seem to be some merit in adopting 
the third general policy option highlighted above. In particular 
reliance on domestic energy supplies and reducing dependence 
on external supplies removes the key obstacle to achieving energy 
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security. While it is true that reliance on external actors for the 
necessary investments to establish and maintain a nuclear energy 
programme (as well as alternative renewable energy programmes 
such as solar and wind energy sectors) cannot be avoided, these 
actors will likely be non-governmental, private sector entities. Bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements between the Jordanian gov-
ernment and other governments have been pursued and signed 
(and others continue to be sought) and these agreements repre-
sent the framework for Jordan’s nuclear energy cooperation with 
external actors, it is likely to be private sector multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) that actually engage with the research, plan-
ning, construction and maintenance of the nuclear energy infra-
structure. This involvement will be essential to Jordan’s nuclear 
energy programme going forward and this presents an interesting 
dynamic. External supplies of hydrocarbons are fixed in location 
and are very sensitive to changes in domestic and international 
relations. At the same time the kind of MNCs involved in nuclear 
energy as discussed above are actually quite mobile, flexible and 
not nearly as sensitive to changes in international relations as 
those involved in hydrocarbons production and transportation. 
The commodities (knowledge, technology, expertise, financial re-
sources, equipment and infrastructure) being sourced from these 
MNCs are also less fixed than the hydrocarbons resources that are 
sourced from external actors in those sectors. The result, there-
fore, is that domestic energy can be produced while at the same 
time reliance on external actors is transformed and made more 
stable thus contributing to energy security. 
Conclusions 
In understanding the Jordanian nuclear energy programme it is 
necessary to identify the level of energy insecurity the country faces 
and the nature of the energy security issues that policy-makers in 
Amman contend with. The overall reliance on imports of energy 
from a  small number of external sources has left Jordan facing 
economic and political problems due to the rising fuel bill and the 
negative impact on economic growth this presents. Furthermore, 
Jordan’s reliance on just a small number of energy sources has left 
the country extremely susceptible to changes in the international 
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relations of the MENA region. In the face of such changes as the 
2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq the Jordanian government 
has found that its limited agency at the international level has left it 
unable to influence international relations in order to promote its 
own energy security. At the same time new policy directions which 
have sought to diversify energy supplies, including the reliance on 
Egypt for natural gas, have also fell foul to instability in other coun-
tries which is outside of the influence of the Jordanian government. 
Faced with this situation and with few significant natural resources 
of its own along with growing budget and trade deficits the Jordani-
an government has turned to the development of domestic energy 
sources as a means to promote its energy security and by extension 
political and economic stability. 
It is hoped that the nuclear energy programme will help alleviate 
Jordan’s energy insecurity by relying on domestic supplies of fuel 
(uranium ore) and by diversifying the involvement of both external 
state and non-state actors in the Jordanian energy market. These 
factors should increase Jordan’s resistance to changes in the inter-
national system and regional relations in particular. The interna-
tional legal framework that is being put in place, including bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements, should contribute to the ways in 
which the programme develops and to the way it is perceived by ex-
ternal actors. The Jordanian case can be explained using an under-
standing of energy security as discussed above and we can conclude 
that energy security is a key challenge for policy-makers. Further-
more, a nuclear energy programme would use domestic supplies of 
energy, reduce the need for energy imports, and diversify the range 
of international actors relied upon (for technology, maintenance 
and so on).  
Other states in the MENA region also fit this model of energy 
insecurity and stand to gain some of the same advantages that Jor-
dan seeks if they develop their own domestic energy programmes 
be they nuclear or alternative renewable energy programmes such 
as solar or wind energy. The level of available domestic supplies of 
nuclear fuel and the extent to which they engage with other gov-
ernments to develop a multilateral (and bilateral) legal framework 
for such programmes as well as the engagement with external 
non-state actors in the development of the infrastructure is im-
portant. These factors will help determine both the reality and the 
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perceptions of these nuclear programmes and their roles in com-
bating energy insecurity for some countries.
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